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Conscious Parallelism: The Business Judgment
Defense in a Summary Judgment Context
The Sherman Act's prohibition of conspiracy in restraint of trade'
has posed the perennial problem of distinguishing between independ-
ent action and anticompetitive agreement. The difficulty of this task is
accentuated when plaintiffs' evidence of "consciously parallel ' 2 busi-
ness behavior, offered to prove conspiracy, is met by business justifica-
tions for parallel conduct presented in defendants' summary judgment
motions. This Note begins by discussing the basic principles of Sher-
man Act conspiracy and inferential proof of concerted action in a sum-
mary judgment context. The Note addresses the various standards
governing the doctrine of conscious parallelism, then focuses on the
development, application, and limitation of the business judgment de-
fense to conspiratorial inferences drawn from conscious parallelism.
The Note contrasts the Third and Fifth Circuits' approaches to evaluat-
ing conscious parallelism and accompanying business justifications in
summary judgment motions. The Note concludes that the Fifth Cir-
cuit's limitation of the business judgment defense undermines the pur-
poses of the Sherman Act and is inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent. In contrast, the Third Circuit's formulation both recognizes
the importance of business justifications in determining antitrust liabil-
ity and preserves the trial judge's latitude in assessing the business con-
text of the suspect conduct. The Note recommends that courts
uniformly adopt the Third Circuit analysis.
The Fundamentals of Sherman Act Conspiracy
Congress enacted several major provisions of the Sherman Act to
deal with anticompetitive conduct involving multiple parties.3 Section
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See infra text accompanying note 4.
2. The term "conscious parallelism" refers to the "common practice among firms in a
concentrated industry of conducting their similar businesses in v. uniform manner, aware
that their counterparts are pursuing the same course of action." Note, Conscious Parallelism
and the Sherman Act: An Analysis anda Proposal, 30 VAND. L. Rnv. 1227, 1228 (1977). See
generally id. at 1228-37. For a detailed economic analysis of conscious parallelism, see R.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 39-77 (1976).
3. See generally Rahl, Conspiracy and the Antitrust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743, 744-48
(1950).
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1 of the Act provides in pertinent part that "[e]very contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations is de-
clared to be illegal.' 4 It is axiomatic that unilateral conduct by a soli-
tary entity cannot violate section 1.5 This same principle applies to a
claim arising from that part of section 2 of the Sherman Act that pros-
cribes "a combination or conspiracy to monopolize. ' 6 Thus, when sev-
eral parties are accused of anticompetitive activity, a prima facie case
under either section requires proof that the defendants engaged in con-
certed action.
7
Anticompetitive agreement is the gravamen of a Sherman Act con-
spiracy complaint." As the United States Supreme Court noted in
American Tobacco v. United States,9 proof of conspiracy is established
by demonstrating "a unity of purpose or a common design and under-
standing, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrangement."' 0
This ostensibly straight-forward definition of agreement has become
increasingly difficult to apply in an era of shifting commercial relation-
ships and increasing business sophistication." In recent years, parallel
refusals to deal, particularly in the course of motion picture distribu-
tion, have posed especially vexing problems for the courts.' 2 The Sher-
man Act itself was drafted with simpler economic scenarios in mind.'
3
With the scope of the Act so heavily dependent on the definition of the
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
5. United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); Sierra Wine & Liquor Co. v.
Heublein, Inc., 626 F.2d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1980); Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instru-
ments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 286 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 2 of the Act is primarily directed at single-firm mo-
nopolistic conduct though it encompasses both joint and individual action. Turner, The Def-
inition ofAgreement Under the Sherman 4ct: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75
HARV. L. Rayv. 655, 655 (1962).
7. Granddad Bread, Inc. v. Continental Baking Co., 612 F.2d 1105, 1111-12 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1676 (1981). Certain claims under § 7 of the Clayton Act, the
Robinson-Patman Act, and the Wilson Tariff Act may also require proof of concerted ac-
tion. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1165 (E.D.
Pa. 1981).
8. Theatre Enter. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954). See
also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
9. 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
10. Id. at 810.
11. See Turner, supra note 6, at 656.
12. See infra notes 51, 74-79, 100-06 & accompanying text.
13. See Rahl, suplra note 3, at 744-48; Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Ori'nal and Pri-
mary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65,
93-101 (1982). Cf. Baxter, Separation ofPowers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common
Law"Nature ofAntitrust Law, 60 Tax. L. REv. 661, 662-63 (1982) ("The antitrust laws were
written with awareness of the diversity of business conduct and with the knowledge that
detailed statutes which would prohibit socially undesirable conduct would lack the flex-
ibility needed to encourage... desirable conduct.").
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term "agreement," the judiciary has assumed the onerous burden of
characterizing different forms of business conduct with virtually identi-
cal economic consequences as either independent or concerted action.14
Inferential Proof of Conspiracy in a Summary Judgment
Context
The combination or conspiracy essential to a Sherman Act viola-
tion may be established either directly or circumstantially. 15 Plaintiffs
rarely have the luxury of relying on an overt agreement to restrain
trade or fix prices as a basis of their proof.16 Consequently, circum-
stantial evidence is the foundation of most Sherman Act conspiracy
cases. The task of inferring the ultimate fact of conspiracy from fre-
quently ambiguous circumstances affords judges considerable discre-
tion in defendants' summary judgment motions.
General Principles
Under rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of mate-
rial fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.' 7 If an antitrust defendant moving for summary judgment
presents a valid justification for parallel conduct, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff opposing the motion to produce "specific factual support"
for the conspiracy claim. 18
14. See Turner, supra note 6, at 656.
15. See Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700,
703-04 (1969); American Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946).
16. See General Chem., Inc. v. Exxon Chem. Co., 625 F.2d 1231, 1233 (5th Cir. 1980).
17. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. Cwv. P. 56(c).
Subsection (c) particularizes a bifurcated standard that the party opposing summary
judgment must meet to defeat the motion. Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 469 (1st Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976). But see First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391
U.S. 253, 288-89 (1967) (adverse party need show only sufficient evidence of a dispute to
require resolution by judge or jury). When the moving party has met its burden under rule
56(c), the adverse party must then establish the existence of a fact that is both "genuine" and
"material." Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d at 464. But see First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities
Serv. Co., 391 U.S. at 288-89 (conclusive proof not required). A material issue affects the
outcome of the litigation, Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d at 464; a genuine issue exists where
there is a substantial dispute that requires resolution by a judge or jury, First Nat'l Bank v.
Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. at 289.
18. Program Eng'g v. Triangle Publications, 634 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1980). See
also Modern Home Inst. Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 513 F.2d 102, 110-11 (2d
Cir. 1975).
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The application of rule 56 to antitrust cases is a source of continu-
ing controversy.' 9 In Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System,20 the
Supreme Court stated that "summary procedures should be used spar-
ingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play lead-
ing roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,
and hostile witnesses thicken the plot."' 2' The circumspect language of
the Poller Court has been qualified by a later opinion in First National
Bank v. Cities Service Co. 22 In upholding the summary judgment for
defendant Cities Service Company, the Court stated:
While we recognize the importance of preserving litigants' rights to a
trial on their claims, we are not prepared to extend those rights to the
point of requiring that anyone who files an antitrust complaint set-
ting forth a valid cause of action be entitled to a full dress trial
notwithstanding the absence of any significant probative evidence
tending to support the complaint.
23
In Cities Service, the Court interpreted rule 56(e) 24 to prevent the
plaintiff from relying on bare allegations in the complaint "coupled
with the hope that something could be developed at trial to support
those allegations." 25 In order to present the issue of conspiracy to the
jury, the plaintiff must produce significant probative evidence from
which a trier of fact could find illegal concerted action on the basis of
reasonable inference rather than speculation.26 A complete failure to
produce evidence indicating a conspiratorial agreement beyond mere
parallel conduct is the clearest example of legal insufficiency that justi-
fies summary judgment.
27
Courts following Cities Service have often granted summary judg-
ment in favor of antitrust defendants. 28 Disputes concerning the sub-
19. See generally Rogers, Summary Judgment in Antilrust Conspiracy Litigation, 10
Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 667 (1979).
20. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
21. Id. at 473. "Where there has been no opportunity for discovery or it has yet to be
undertaken or is incomplete, the courts have applied this [Poller] policy to prohibit alto-
gether summary judgment on the merits in antitrust litigation. .. ." Willmar Poultry Co.
v. Morton-Norwich Prod., Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915
(1976).
22. 391 U.S. 253 (1967).
23. Id. at 290.
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides, in pertinent part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not
so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
25. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1967).
26. See infra note 32 & accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 52-54 & accompanying text.
28. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1140
n.53 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (citing numerous cases).
[Vol. 35
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jective elements of an antitrust conspiracy, such as state of mind, are
not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion in the absence of
significant probative evidence supporting an inference of a defendant's
conscious commitment to a conspiratorial scheme.
29
The probative nature of circumstantial evidence is ascertained by
applying various principles governing the permissibility of factual in-
ferences.30 The ultimate task of evaluating the plausibility of compet-
ing inferences rests with the trier of fact.31 A trier of fact may only
draw those inferences that are reasonably susceptible from the evi-
dence; 32 it may not speculate.33 In a summary judgment situation, the
court must consider every reasonable inference from underlying facts
in favor of the party opposing the motion.34 Thus, a court's treatment
of inferences is critical to the resolution of a summary judgment motion
in a case relying on circumstantial evidence.
Policy Considerations
Summary judgment presents an inherent conflict between the con-
stitutional right to trial by jury and the pragmatic concern for a swift
resolution of specious litigation. 35 While there is considerable support
for greater use of summary adjudication in antitrust cases, the complex
legal and factual nature of these cases has made many judges extremely
reluctant to grant summary judgment motions.36 Nevertheless, the na-
29. Id. at 1170.
30. Id. "Establishing conspiracy as a permissible inference, like any empirical inquiry,
is merely an exercise in inductive reasoning-inference based upon the cumulation of con-
sistent data." Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499, 531 (E.D.
Mich. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
The principles governing the permissibility of inferences apply equally to motions for
summary judgment, motions for directed verdict, or any other situation in which a party
seeks to meet his or her evidentiary burden by means of inference. Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1171 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
31. See Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 116 (3d. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
32. British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 981 (1979). See Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 884
(8th Cir. 1978); Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499, 531 (E.D.
Mich. 1974), ajJ'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
33. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the alleged factual dispute will not suffice to
avert summary judgment, because speculation will impermissibly result. British Airways
Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
34. See United States v. Diebold Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); American Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Delta Communications Corp., 590 F.2d 100, 101-02 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
926 (1979). As the Supreme Court has stated, "the essential requirement is that mere specu-
lation not be allowed to do duty for probative facts after making due allowance for all
reasonably possible inferences favoring the party whose case is attacked." Galloway v.
United States, 319 U.S. 372, 395 (1943).
35. See Rogers, supra note 19, at 688-89.
36. Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
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ture of antitrust litigation encourages summary disposition.3 7 The Na-
tional Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures
reported that "[oln average, antitrust cases take longer to litigate than
other civil litigation; that some antitrust cases absorb enormous re-
sources and time; and that undue delay is a serious problem in a signifi-
cant number of complex antitrust cases."' 38 The statutory remedy of
treble damages for private antitrust plaintiffs also "creates a special
temptation for the institution of vexatious litigation."39 Plaintiffs, hav-
ing suffered injury caused by normal business practices, may seek re-
covery without sufficient factual basis by casting their complaint in
antitrust terms. 40 Moreover, Sherman Act cases tend to be especially
difficult for jury consideration. 41 As Chief Justice Burger aptly noted,
"it borders on cruelty to draft people to sit for long periods to cope with
issues largely beyond their grasp."
'42
A court's summary judgment approach assumes special signifi-
cance when the plaintiffs case is predicated upon circumstantial evi-
dence. By preventing such a case from going to a jury, a judge protects
neutral principles of law from powerful forces outside the scope of the
law, including compassion and prejudice.43 A judge might also engage
in undesirable speculation when weighing the inferences of conspiracy
and of independent action 44 on a summary judgment motion. On bal-
ance, however, it would appear that the danger inherent in the former
denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979). See Report of the National Commission for the Review ofAnti-
trust Laws and Procedures, 80 F.R.D. 509, 565 (1979).
37. Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979).
38. Report of the National Commissionfor the Review ofAntitrust Laws and Procedures,
supra note 36, at 521. "1977 figures of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
showed that, for private antitrust cases reaching trial, the median time between filing and
disposition was 44 months and that 10 percent of these cases took longer than 68 months
(5.67 years)." Id. at 525.
39. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 478 (1962) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
40. Blair Foods , Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610 F.2d 665, 672 (9th Cir. 1980).
41. See United States v. United Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 465-69 (1978); Weit v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 464 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 988 (1982).
42. Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 464 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982) (quoting remarks of the Chief Justice of the United States,
Meeting of the Conference of Federal Chief District Judges, Flagstaff, Ariz., Aug. 7, 1979).
43. Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
44. The plaintiff cannot carry his or her burden of proof by a preponderence of the
evidence when "two or three explanations are equally likely reconstructions of the defend-
ants' behavior, there is not a whit of evidence for preferring one explanation over the others,
and only one is sinister.. . .A jury needs to be able to premise its verdict on more than
conjecture." Nye, Can Conduct-Oriented Enforcement Inhibit Conscious Parallelism?, 44 AN-
TITRUST LJ. 206, 222 (1975).
[Vol. 35
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situation is greater than that in the latter-especially in view of the
complex and potentially vexatious nature of antitrust litigation.
The Doctrine of Conscious Parallelism
Origins
The doctrine of conscious parallelism45 initially emerged in a se-
ries of private suits involving the motion picture industry brought
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States,46 individual members of a group of motion picture distributors,
at the request of two large first-run exhibitors, simultaneously imposed
identical restrictions on subsequent showings of the films that they dis-
tributed.47 There was no direct evidence of an agreement to impose the
same restrictions, but it was demonstrated that each distributor knew
that all the other distributors had been approached with the same pro-
posal and that the imposition of the restriction would be feasible only if
adhered to by all the distributors.48 Additionally, the plaintiff demon-
strated that the identical action taken by the distributors had created a
likelihood of increased profits for each distributor.49 The Supreme
Court ruled that these facts permitted an inference of a tacit agreement
between the distributors.50 Subsequent lower court decisions relied on
Interstate Circuit to infer conspiracies from uniform refusals to deal or
other parallel business activity.
51
The Supreme Court limited the use of parallel business activity to
infer conspiracy in Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing
Corp. 52 The Court held that parallel business behavior is admissible
circumstantial evidence of conspiracy but does not "conclusively"
demonstrate an illegal agreement.
5 3
As a matter of logic and precedent, conscious parallelism is "neu-
tral" evidence insufficient to support an inference of conspiracy in op-
position to a summary judgment motion.5 4 As Professor Turner states:
Conscious parallelism is never meaningful by itself, but always as-
sumes whatever significance it might have from additional facts.
45. See supra note 2.
46. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
47. Id. at 214-19.
48. Id. at 222.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 227.
51. See, e.g., William Goldman Theatres Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 150 F.2d 738 (3d Cir.
1945); Milgram v. Loew's Inc., 94 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Pa. 1950), a'd, 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952).
52. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
53. Id. at 540-41. See infra notes 74-79 & accompanying text.
54. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1172 (E.D.
Pa. 1981).
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Thus, conscious parallelism is not even evidence of agreement unless
there are some other facts indicating that the decisions of the alleged
conspirators were interdependent, that the decisions were consistent
with the individual self-interest of those concerned only if they all
decided the same way.55
Thus, interdependent decision-making creates a reasonable expectation
that conduct would have been dissimilar if truly independent decisions
had been made.
56
Evaluating Parallel Business Behavior: The Third Circuit Approach and Its
Progeny
Lower courts have attempted to develop a coherent framework for
evaluating the probative significance of conscious parallelism in the
summary judgment context. In Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp. ,57 Chief
Judge Seitz of the Third Circuit articulated a novel approach to this
problem:
The law is settled that proof of consciously parallel business behavior
is circumstantial evidence from which an agreement, tacit or express,
can be inferred but that such evidence, without more, is insufficient
unless circumstances under which it occurred make the inference of
rational independent choice less attractive than that of concerted
action. 58
Under this formulation, if it is equally possible to draw the inference of
rational independent choice and the inference of concerted action, then
the offered proof is insufficient to defeat a summary judgment mo-
tion.59 Thus, Chief Judge Seitz's approach uses a probability method:
the inference of conspiracy must be more probable than the inference
of independent action in order for the inference of conspiracy to be
permissible.
55. Turner, supra note 6, at 658 (emphasis in original). But see Posner, Oligopol) and
the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested4pproach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1575-78 (1969) (tacit
collusion by oligopolist violates § 1).
56. Turner, supra note 6, at 659.
57. 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). The court of ap-
peals vacated and remanded the district court's grant of pre-discovery summary judgment
for the defendants on a complaint which alleged "a course of interdependent consciously
parallel action." Id. at 439. The Third Circuit determined that the lower court had treated
the summary judgment motion as the functional equivalent of a rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, and reviewed the lower court's order on the standard
applicable to a motion to dismiss. Id. at 444. The court of appeals determined that the
complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 445.
58. Id. at 446 (comparing Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939),
with First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 274-88 (1968)). Accord Ambrook
Enter. v. Time Inc., 612 F.2d 604, 615 (2d Cir. 1979); Consolidated Farmers Mut. Ins. v.
Anchor Say. Ass'n, 480 F. Supp. 640, 649-50 (D. Kan. 1979).
59. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1174 (E.D.
Pa. 1981). But see Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1324-26 (1 1th Cir.
1982) (rejects "rule of equally probable inferences" in a wrongful death case).
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In a prior case, Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Products
Co. ,60 Chief Judge Seitz had specified two particular circumstances
that generally have been accepted 61 as critical to a determination of
conspiracy based upon parallel conduct: 1) a showing of acts by de-
fendants in contradiction of their own economic interests, and 2) satis-
factory demonstration of a motivation to enter an agreement. 62 The
absence of activity detrimental to economic self-interest "renders con-
sciously parallel business behavior 'meaningless and in no way indi-
cates agreement.' "63 A motive to conspire against the plaintiff is also
critical because, in the absence of a demonstration of a benefit derived
from an anticompetitive agreement, the requisite inference of conspir-
acy does not necessarily follow from a mere coincidence of conduct.64
Reading Bogosian and Venzie Corp. together, it appears that the pres-
ence of both uneconomical behavior and motive to conspire lead to the
conclusion that the inference of conspiracy is more probable than the
inference of independent action.
Other circuits have embraced a more limited construct, requiring
only the first of Judge Seitz's two prongs. The Eighth Circuit, inAdmi-
ral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co. ,65 held that "[o]nly where the
pattern of action undertaken is inconsistent with the self-interest of the
individual actors, were they acting alone, may an agreement be in-
ferred solely from. . . parallel action."
66
The Ninth Circuit recently took an intermediate position, ruling
that consciously parallel behavior may be probative of conspiracy if the
parallel acts "were against each conspirator's self-interest, that is, that
the decision to act was not based on a good faith business judgment.
'67
60. 521 F.2d 1309 (3d Cir. 1975). Plaintiffs, a group of fireproofing contractors,
brought an action against a competitor and against a manufacturer of non-asbestos
fireproofing spray alleging violations of§ I of the Sherman Act. The circuit court upheld an
order granting defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. on plaintiffs' claim of a concerted
refusal to deal. Id. at 1318.
61. Id. at 1314. See, e.g., Consolidated Farmers Mut. Ins. v. Anchor Say. Ass'n, 480 F.
Supp. 640, 649-50 (D. Kan. 1979). See infra note 71 & accompanying text.
62. Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prod. Co., 521 F.2d at 1314 (citing First
Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 287 (1968), and Delaware Valley Marine Sup-
ply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839
(1962)).
63. Id. (citing Turner, supra note 6, at 681).
64. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 287 (1968); Venzie Corp. v.
United States Mineral Prod. Co., 521 F.2d at 1315.
65. 585 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1978).
66. Id. at 884. See also Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 327
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Modem Home Inst. Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 513 F.2d 102,
Ill (2d Cir. 1975).
67. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 884 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Pan-
Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 559 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
927 (1981).
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The Ninth Circuit, however, qualified its approach by indicating that a
showing of a plausible motive for the defendants to particpate in a con-
spiracy may sometimes be required.
68
The common denominator of these three approaches to determin-
ing the probative value of conscious parallelism is a reliance on "plus
factors" 69- factors beyond the fact of the defendants' uniform con-
duct. "Plus factors" are independent items of evidence that, when cou-
pled with evidence of conscious parallelism, tend to support a finding
of collusive agreement.70 The precise quality and quantity of the "plus
factors" necessary to infer conspiracy are generally determined on a
case-by-case basis.71 Once the plaintiff has met the initial burden of
presenting circumstances that suggest interdependence, the summary
judgment inquiry focuses on the defendant's attempt to show business
justifications for consciously parallel action.
72
The Business Judgment Defense
In the absence of monopolistic or conspiratorial conduct, the Sher-
man Act does not restrict independent business judgment. Accord-
ingly, a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private
enterprise is free to exercise his or her independent discretion as to the
parties with whom he or she deals.73 Thus, the extent to which a court
considers the context of business conduct and any business justification
for conscious parallelism apparent from that conduct may, in many
cases, significantly influence the prophylactic function of summary
judgment.
Evolution of the Business Judgment Defense
The Supreme Court's decision in Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount
Film Distributing Corp.74 limiting the conscious parallelism doctrine
represents the initial step in the evolution of the business judgment de-
fense. In Theatre Enterprises, the operator of a suburban movie house
alleged a conspiracy to restrict first-run motion pictures to downtown
68. See Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 885 (9th Cir. 1982).
69. The first reported usage of the term "plus factor" in an antitrust context occurred in
C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 892 (1952). See generally Blechman, Conscious Parallelism, Signalling and Facilitating
Devices: The Problem of Tacit Collusion Under the Antirust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV.
881, 885-87 (1975).
70. Montana v. Superamerica, 559 F. Supp. 298, 302 (D. Mont. 1983).
71. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 371-82 (1981).
72. See supra notes 58-67 & accompanying text.
73. United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Delta Communication Corp., 590 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979);
Anaya v. Las Cruces Sun News, 455 F.2d 670, 672 (10th Cir. 1972).
74. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
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theatres. The suburban exhibitor contended that because all of the de-
fendant movie distributors had refused to provide him with first-run
motion pictures he was entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of law.
The defendants offered substantial evidence explaining the reasons that
led the industry to confine the exclusive showing of first-run pictures to
downtown theatres.75 At trial, the jury decided for the defendants and
the district court's judgment entered on the verdict was affirmed by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.76 The Fourth Circuit and the
Supreme Court agreed that there was evidence to support both an in-
ference of conspiracy and an inference of independent business judg-
ment.77 Thus, an issue was presented that required submission to the
jury for resolution. Despite the limited precedential value of this deci-
sion,78 the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that evidence of
business justification can be utilized to counter inferences of conspiracy
drawn from parallel conduct.7
9
A more troublesome situation emerges when allegations of "plus
factors" are countered by evidence of business justification. Some
courts have held that rule 56(e) mandates that plaintiffs rebut defend-
ants' evidence of business justifications with a counter offer of evidence
raising a material factual issue.80 Specifically, plaintiffs must respond
75. The various respondents advanced much the same reasons for denying peti-
tioner's offers. Among other reasons they asserted that day-and-date first-runs are
normally granted only to noncompeting theatres. Since the Crest is in "substantial
competition" with the downtown theatres, a day-and-date arrangement would be
economically unfeasible .... [A]n exclusive license would be economically un-
sound because the Crest is a suburban theatre, located in a small shopping center,
and served by limited public transportation facilities; and, with a drawing area of
less than one-tenth that of a downtown theatre, it cannot compare with those easily
accessible theatres in the power to draw patrons. Hence the downtown theatres
offer far greater opportunities for the widespread advertisement and exploitation of
newly released features, which is thought necessary to maximize the overall return
from subsequent runs as well as first-runs.
Id. at 540.
76. 201 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1953).
77. Theatre Enter. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. at 542; Theatre Enter. v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 201 F.2d at 313.
78. See Nye, supra note 44, at 208. "[T]he Supreme Court reserve[d] judgment on the
issue of whether and when evidence of mere conscious parallelism will support an inference
of conspiracy. . . ." Id. at 207.
79. Some circuit court decisions after Theatre Enterprises used business justifications to
neutralize a bare allegation of conscious parallelism. Once parallel conduct is shown to be
consistent with independent competitive decisions, additional facts or circumstances are
needed to show that the decisions were interdependent and thus raise the inference of a tacit
agreement to boycott. See, e.g., Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,
322 F.2d 656, 665 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963).
80. See, e.g., Program Eng'g v. Triangle Publications, 634 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir.
1980); Aviation Specialties v. United Technologies Corp., 568 F.2d 1186, 1192 (5th Cir.
1976).
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to a summary judgment motion with an explanation reconciling facts
that suggest a good faith business judgment with the existence of an
alleged conspiracy."' Thus, a reasonable business judgment defense
presented in a summary judgment motion, uncontradicted by any evi-
dence of "plus factors," may be sufficient to dismiss an underdeveloped
interdependence theory in the complaint.
The Supreme Court's opinion in First National Bank v. Cities Serv-
ice Co. 82 provides a detailed discussion of the business judgment de-
fense in the context of a summary judgment motion. In Cities Service,
the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to sell Iranian oil to several ma-
jor oil companies. He asserted that these efforts were thwarted by a
global conspiracy to boycott Iranian oil in response to Iran's nationali-
zation of certain foreign industrial assets. The plaintiff suggested that
Cities Service Company's abrupt decision not to puchase Iranian oil
after extensive negotiations, coupled with the attractiveness of the
plaintiffs offer, demonstrated participation in an illegal conspiracy.
Faced with the issue of Cities Service Company's summary judgment
motion, the Supreme Court reasoned that these facts standing alone
might well be sufficient to require the jury to determine that the de-
fendant's decision not to deal with the plaintiff was the product of such
a conspiracy.83 However, the Court held that summary judgment was
still proper in light of the overwhelming contrary evidence of benign
motives "involving the exercise of business judgment." 84 Implicit in
this holding is the conclusion that the the defendant's business judg-
ment defense was more persuasive than the plaintiffs evidence of "plus
factors." Thus, the business judgment defense mandated the conclu-
sion that defendants engaged in independent activity.
Today, the Cities Service approach provides the primary analytical
framework for the use of the business judgment defense.85 Summary
judgment for defendants has been granted in numerous cases in which
the inference of conspiracy to be drawn from conscious parallelism was
superseded by an opposing inference of independent action.8 6 The de-
fendants' alleged retaliatory motivation for a group boycott in Cities
Service was overwhelmed by a variety of legitimate business conse-
81. See Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 694 F.2d 1017, 1027 n.27 (5th Cir. 1983);
Modem Home Inst. Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 513 F.2d 102, 111 (2d Cir.
1975).
82. 391 U.S. 253 (1967).
83. Id. at 277.
84. Id.
85. See generally Rogers, supra note 19.
86. See, e.g., Modem Home Inst. Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 513 F.2d
102, 111 (2d Cir. 1975); American Structures, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 545 F. Supp.
1021, 1027-28 (E.D. Pa. 1982); see also Rogers, supra note 19, at 671-78.
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quences sufficient to deter the purchase of the plaintiff's Iranian oil.87
Understandably, lower courts relying on Cities Service have tended to
grant summary judgment only when they consider the business judg-
ment defense overwhelming.
88
The Third Circuit Approach
The business judgment defense is an integral component of Chief
Judge Seitz's formula for determining the probative value of conscious
parallelism, and, hence, determining which inference-of conspiracy or
of independent action-will prevail in Third Circuit cases. 89 In Tose v.
First Pennsylvania Bank,90 the plaintiff, the owner of a controlling part-
nership interest in a professional football club, alleged a violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act arising from a conspiracy by the defend-
ant banks to refuse to grant him a profitable loan. In support of their
summary judgment motion, the defendants presented an array of busi-
ness reasons for their uniform refusal to loan the funds, including un-
resolved legal obstacles to the loan and the plaintiff's unfavorable
reputation.91 In upholding summary judgment for the defendants, the
Third Circuit weighed these business justifications and the "inherent
improbability of an agreement to refuse profitable business for non-
economic reasons" 92 against the plaintiff's evidence of a motivation to
enter into an agreement. The court concluded that the plaintiff's evi-
dence was clearly insufficient. 93 Thus, under the Third Circuit ap-
proach, a judge weighs business justifications for parallel conduct
against the plaintiffs evidence of "plus factors" in determining whether
the evidence of "plus factors" is sufficient to allow an inference of con-
spiracy. If a defendant can overcome plaintiff's showing of "plus fac-
tors" by demonstrating that the defendant was motivated by an
independent business decision and not an unlawful agreement, then
summary judgment should be granted.
94
87. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. at 280.
88. See, e.g., Solinger v. A & M Records, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 402, 409 (N.D. Cal. 1982);
Consolidated Farmers Mut. Ins. v. Anchor Say. Ass'n, 480 F. Supp. 640, 645-46 (D. Kan.
1979); see also Rogers, supra note 19, at 671-78.
89. See supra notes 57-62 & accompanying text.
90. 648 F.2d 879 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981).
91. Id. at 889.
92. Id. at 895.
93. Id.
94. See supra note 44; Edward J. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 114
(3d Cir. 1980) (upholding the grant of a directed verdict); American Structures, Inc. v. Fidel-
ity & Deposit Co., 545 F. Supp. 1021, 1027-28 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsu-
shita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Cf. Weit v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 463 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982)
(in a price-fixing case, "when the plaintiff or prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence
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Fifth Circuit Limitation
The Fifth Circuit is apparently the only circuit that expressly lim-
its the use of the Third Circuit's probability method95 for determining
the probative value of conscious parallelism in the summary judgment
context. Theoretically, a court, in passing on a motion for summary
judgment, must indulge every reasonable inference from established
facts in favor of the party opposing the motion.96 This raises the ques-
tion of how the reasonableness of an inference should be evaluated.
The Fifth Circuit, in American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Delta
Communications Corp. ,97 ruled:
Insofar as any weighing of inferences from given facts is permissible,
the task of the court is not to weigh these against each other but
rather to cull the universe of possible inferences from the facts estab-
lished by weighing each against the abstract standard of reasonable-
ness, casting aside those which do not meet it and focusing solely on
those which do.98
alone, the inference of unlawful agreement rather than individual business judgment must
be the compelling, if not exclusive, rational inference").
95. See supra notes 58-59 & accompanying text.
96. See supra note 34 & accompanying text.
97. 590 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979). Delta alleged two major
conspiracies that unreasonably restrained its entrance into the television market: 1) the de-
fendants, including the major networks and AT&T, collectively conspired to prevent plain-
tiff and other UHF stations from receiving fair remuneration from the television networks
for the service of delivering their signal, and 2) defendants conspired to establish, maintain
and apply AT&T tariffs for the delivery of network signals which discriminated against
Delta and other UHF stations. 408 F. Supp. 1075, 1087 (S.D. Miss. 1976). The district court
rejected Delta's assertions of consciously parallel refusals to deal. "Delta's claim fail[ed] to
meet the Cities Service summary judgment test in that the mass of discovery developed in
this case clearly points to the much more plausible inference that the network dealings with
Delta grew not from any conspiratorial plan but from independent business decisions which
concurred in no more than the separate conclusions that Delta was unable to deliver a suffi-
cient television audience to make more favorable dealings with Delta economically sound
.... Delta... failed to develop facts from which the most probable inference to be drawn
was conspiracy." Id. at 1087. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 579 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1978).
On petition for rehearing en banc, Delta argued that the court of appeals erred in al-
lowing the trial court to weigh inferences from the facts established and adopt the more
probable inference in support of summary judgment. 590 F.2d 100, 101 (5th Cir. 1979).
98. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Delta Communications Corp., 590 F.2d at 101-02. The
Fifth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc despite language throughout the trial
court opinion indicating the use of a "probability" approach to assessing inferences from
conscious parallelism. The court of appeals focused on isolated district court language
which suggested that no inference of conspiracy would be reasonable from facts that show
no more than a failure to conclude an unattractive bargain. Id. at 102. The court, after
reviewing the defendant's economic justifications for refusing to deal, concluded: "We do
not believe, in the face of such facts, that an inference of anticompetitive conspiracy is rea-
sonable .... [I1n each instance complained of, the proper rule as set out above has been
applied." Id. See Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Fulton County, 561 F. Supp. 667, 677
(N.D. Ga. 1982); Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 543 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (W.D. La.
1982).
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This decision creates a conceptual distinction between weighing
inferences against each other and weighing them against an abstract
reasonableness standard. This distinction is difficult to make when evi-
dence supporting an inference of conspiracy is countered by business
justifications for parallel conduct. Often, the reasonableness of a con-
spiratorial inference from parallel conduct is dependent upon the
strength of defendant's business justifications.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Southway Theatres v. Georgia Thea-
tre Co. 99 represents a more recent application of the American Tele-
phone & Telegraph reasoning to a summary judgment motion
buttressed by a business judgment defense.100 The Fifth Circuit noted
that the district court, in granting summary judgment for the defend-
ants, utilized a standard that required a determination of the dominant
inference from circumstantial evidence.' 0 ' The Fifth Circuit agreed
that the initial "task of the district court on the motion for summary
judgment was to examine the circumstances surrounding the parallel
failures to deal alleged by Southway."'10 2 However, Judge Hill wrote
that the district court's dominant inference analysis overstated the bur-
den that the plaintiff must meet in order to survive a summary judg-
ment motion under Cities Service.10 3 According to the Fifth Circuit,
language in Cities Service'04 that appears to weigh competing infer-
ences is simply applying "a basic rule [of antitrust conspiracy law] that
the inference of a conspiracy is always unreasonable when it is based
solely on parallel behavior that can be explained as the result of...
independent business judgment."' 05 Judge Hill stated that the Cities
Service Court compared the probability of competing inferences before
it examined "other evidence" that was intended by the plaintiff to show
that the refusal to deal occurred under circumstances that would indi-
cate a conspiracy.106 Both Southway and American Telephone & Tele-
graph held that the Supreme Court applied an abstract standard of
reasonableness to this evidence of "plus factors" that determined the
probative value of the parallel refusal to deal.107 Consequently, the
99. 672 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1982).
100. In Southway, a theatre owner brought an action against several competing theatre
chains and national film distributors alleging a conspiracy to deprive the owner of opportu-
nities to license first-run films. Defendants responded with a myriad of business justifica-
tions for the uniform conduct. Id. at 502-04.
101. Id. at 493.
102. Id. at 492.
103. Id. at 487.
104. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 280 (1967).
105. Southway Theatres v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d at 494.
106. Id.
107. Id.; American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Delta Communications Corp., 590 F.2d 100, 102
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
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weighing of inferences created by these "plus factors" against infer-
ences from evidence of business justification was impermissible.
This analysis suggests that a judge need only consider the reasona-
bleness of the plaintiffs interdependence theory on a summary judg-
ment motion. Accordingly, he or she is not required to consider a
business judgment defense as a force that directly negates the probative
value of a conspiratorial inference from conscious parallelism. Thus, a
judge may disregard evidence of independent action or, at best, utilize
such justifications obliquely when assessing the plausibility of the
plaintiffs "plus factors."
Criticism of the Fifth Circuit Limitation
The Fifth Circuit limitation on the business judgment defense is
untenable. First, the Cities Service opinion implicitly considered the
"plus factors" of conscious parallelism in light of the defendant's busi-
ness justification.108 Evidence of conspiratorial motive, for example,
was compared directly with the probability of good faith business judg-
ment.109 Furthermore, the "other evidence besides a simple failure to
deal," which Southway analyzed" 0 with a reasonableness standard,
also seems to have been weighed, in Cities Service, against the defend-
ant's business justifications."1 ' In short, Cities Service's language does
not accord with the Fifth Circuit position. Additionally, numerous
lower courts have interpreted both Cities Service and Theatre Enter-
prises to allow direct comparison of business justifications with evi-
dence establishing the existence of "plus factors."" 2 Several Fifth
Circuit cases also seem to endorse this view." 3 Finally, the Southway
108. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. at 277, 280. See supra note 84 &
accompanying text.
The Southway court's confusion may stem from a failure to distinguish between evi-
dence of the ultimate fact of conspiracy and evidence establishing the "plus factors" neces-
sary for an effective conscious parallelism theory. Circumstantial proof, apart from
conscious parallelism, which is offered to establish the ultimate fact of conspiracy, is evalu-
ated by giving the party opposing summary judgment the benefit of every reasonable infer-
ence from the evidence. However, many courts utilize a special standard of inference for
conscious parallelism because "plus factors," by establishing an intermediate step to an in-
ference of conspiracy, are a prerequisite to a permissible inference. See Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1176 (E.D. Pa 1981). Judge Hill seemed
to characterize the evidence in Southway as evidence of the ultimate fact of conspiracy
rather than evidence establishing a "plus factor." See Southway Theatres v. Georgia Thea-
tre Co., 672 F.2d at 492-94.
109. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. at 277, 280.
110. Southway Theatres v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d at 494.
111. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. at 277.
112. See supra notes 65-67 & accompanying text.
113. See Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 694 F.2d 1017, 1027 n.27 (5th Cir. 1983) (in-
terpreting Cities Service, the court stated that "the nature of the business relationship be-
tween plaintiff and defendants-whether competitors or not-may be considered in
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and American Telephone & Telegraph reasoning undermines the basic
tenet that independent action is sacrosanct under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. 114 The Fifth Circuit effectively subjugates evidence of busi-
ness justification by adopting a vague reasonableness standard to
determine the probative force of parallel conduct. Defendant's busi-
ness judgment defense should be directly applied against "plus factor"
evidence without being obscured by an abstract standard of reasona-
bleness that focuses on the plausibility of the plaintiff's theory.
The Better Standard
The existence of various overlapping," 5 underinclusive, 116 and
contradictory' 1 7 standards for evaluating conscious parallelism mili-
tates against the expeditious disposition of unsupported Sherman Act
claims through summary judgment. Chief Judge Seitz's method of
evaluating the probative significance of parallel business behavior pro-
vides the clearest and most comprehensive framework for inferential
analysis. ' 8 This Third Circuit approach focuses on the two ancillary
factors generally considered crucial to a conspiratorial inference: the
existence of a motive for concerted action, and action that contradicts
the defendant's economic self-interest.1 9 The "plus factors," and other
determining whether it is more plausible to conclude either unilateral or collusive behav-
ior"); Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 559 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981) (in a summary judgment context, plaintiffs relying on a theory of
conscious parallelism must establish that "defendants engaged in consciously parallel action
• . . which was contrary to their economic self-interest so as not to amount to a good faith
business judgment"); Aviation Specialities, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 568 F.2d
1186 (5th Cir. 1978). Arguably, the standard applied in Pan-Islamic Trade requires a weigh-
ing of "plus factor" evidence against evidence of independent action. The Pan-Islamic
Trade court utilized the American Telephone & Telegraph abstract standard of reasonable-
ness in ruling that plaintiff's asserted inference of conspiracy was impermissible given all the
facts established in the record, including evidence of conscious parallelism. 632 F.2d at 558.
However, Judge Anderson rejected Pan-Islamie's evidence of action contrary to defendants'
economic self-interest as insufficiently probative rather than as abstractly unreasonable. Id.
at 561-64.
114. See supra note 5 & accompanying text.
115. Compare Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prod. Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314 (3d
Cir. 1975) (plaintiff must prove action contrary to defendant's economic self-interest, and
motivation to enter an agreement), with Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d
539, 559 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 527 (1981) (plaintiff must prove defendant is
engaged in consciously parallel action that was contrary to his economic self-interest so as
not to amount to a good faith business judgment).
116. A standard that simply considers the defendant's actions in contradiction of eco-
nomic self-interest, and not other potential "plus factors," may be underinclusive. See P.
MARCUS, ANTITRUST LAW AND PRAcTIcE 198 n.2 (1980).
117. See supra notes 93-114 & accompanying text; see also Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 462-63 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
118. See supra notes 57-64 & accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 61-64 & accompanying text.
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circumstances surrounding parallel behavior that logically suggest Me-
gal agreement, directly oppose evidence of independent action offered
in the defendant's summary judgment motion. In addition, the Third
Circuit approach implicitly recognizes that a jury would be forced to
speculate120 about the legal implications of conscious parallelism un-
less, on balance, an inference of conspiracy is more probable than an
inference of independent action.' 2' This formulation preserves the trial
judge's latitude in assessing the business context of the suspect conduct
while emphasizing the importance of business justifications in deter-
mining antitrust liability. Finally, the availability of extensive case
law 22 applying Chief Judge Seitz's standard facilitates consistent ap-
plication at the trial court level.
Conclusion
The pragmatic considerations of antitrust litigation demand a firm
standard for consistent evaluation of the probative force of conscious
parallelism on a summary judgment motion. Such a standard should
affirm the significance of a defendant's assertion of good faith business
justifications for parallel conduct. The Third Circuit's formulation
emerges as the most desirable approach to this recurrent summary
judgment issue. Conversely, the Fifth Circuit's limitation of the busi-
ness judgment defense seems to defy Supreme Court precedent and ba-
sic Sherman Act doctrine. The Third Circuit's analysis provides a
functional definition of anticompetitive agreement under the Sherman
Act that other circuits should uniformly adopt in conscious parallelism
cases.
Emil John Kotalik, Jr. *
120. See Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 115 (3d Cir.
1980).
121. See supra note 44 & accompanying text.
122. See generally Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp.
1100, 1140-76 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
* Member, Third Year Class.
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